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Introduction
There are elements of continuity and change in contempo-
rary debates about ethics in social science. These debates 
have always been emotive but one change has been the added 
emotional dimension given by some proponents who link 
ethical practice to issues of academic freedom. In the past, 
we may have debated with vigour the ethics of covert 
research, for example, but now we throw around abrasive 
accusations that allege ethical malpractices which threaten 
the very nature of higher education research and impugn 
whole organisations rather than individual researchers (see, 
for example, the accusations against the British Sociological 
Association (BSA), among others, in Lowman and Palys 
(2014)). This raises the interesting question of the ethics of 
ethical debates in social research.
Three new developments have transformed the ethics of 
ethical debates. The first is the strict tightening of ethical 
regulatory frameworks in social science, with the application 
of scientific and medical ethical codes to humanities and 
social science research as part of the neo-liberal marketisa-
tion of higher education. The resistance towards these pro-
cesses has impacted on the ethics of ethical debates as some 
proponents urge a cut loose, hang free and disregard the law 
approach under the impulse of protecting academic freedom 
in ethical practice against ever-tougher restrictions in these 
regulatory frameworks. The second development is the 
emergence of the ‘new ethics’ (a term used by Hammersley 
and Traianou, 2014), where conventional ethical practice is 
supplemented by ethical practices designed to promote social 
justice and human rights. If what matters is the normative 
purpose of the research rather than its scientific standards, a 
‘new ethic’ impacts on researchers’ ethical research practice, 
making research ethics subservient to wider moral precepts.
The third change has been the development of the new 
field of peace and conflict research. This kind of research 
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throws the ‘new ethics’ into particularly high relief because 
of the normative commitment most of its researchers have 
towards making a difference to the lives of people affected 
by conflict, but the higher risks and dangers associated with 
research in conflict zones or in societies emerging precari-
ously out of conflict also significantly tests the relevance and 
applicability of conventional research ethics codes. 
Adaptability in ‘dangerous fields’, as Kovats-Bernat (2002) 
refers to these research sites, is necessary in order to manage 
its risks, making flexibility more important than conformity 
to ethical codes.
Many of the most emotive debates about the ethics of 
ethical practice concern the experiences of peace and conflict 
researchers, and is reflected well in the Alice Goffman Affair, 
which involved academic reaction to Goffman’s (2014) 
research on police relations with the Black community in 
Philadelphia, and the Boston College Affair (see Palys and 
Lowman, 2012), involving the debate around the collapse of 
Boston College’s oral history archive on the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. These two cases teach salutary lessons 
about the ethical challenges and moral dilemmas posed by 
peace and conflict research.
The purpose of this article is fourfold. First, it will elabo-
rate on some of the above methodological trends as they 
affect the peace and conflict research. This field is very 
recent and some researchers have developed reflexive 
accounts of their personal experiences when undertaking 
research in conflict zones or during peace processes. The 
article therefore aims, second, to give a flavour of the content 
of some of these personal reflections as they relate to ethical 
practice. Since this field is so new and will be unfamiliar to 
most readers, the ethical challenges and moral dilemmas the 
field poses researchers justify such a highlight, especially 
given that much of it is conducted by PhD and early career 
researchers who are given little training in this area and are 
open to naivety as a result. Third, the article attempts to draw 
from these diverse personal reflections a codification of the 
ethical, legal and moral challenges in peace and conflict 
research that systematises its opportunities and threats. 
Finally, the article aims to reduce some of the emotion 
involved in the ethics of ethical debates within peace and 
conflict research by developing the idea of a ‘research cove-
nant’ for peace and conflict research that might be useful to 
new researchers entering the field. We begin, however, with 
some reflections on developments in the methodological 
debate about research ethics.
Debating ethics
Despite the strong elements of continuity in contemporary 
debates about ethics, as familiar issues remain highly rele-
vant, such as the boundary between participation and obser-
vation, the independence of researchers from sponsors and 
the appropriateness of covert observation, ethical debates in 
the research methods literature have undergone a transition 
over recent decades, reflecting broader developments in 
global social science. Debates have shifted from narrow con-
cerns with ethics, towards an interest in sensitivity and risk, 
and within risk, there has been a shift from the risks faced by 
respondents to those faced by researchers. While honesty, 
integrity, trust and confidentiality are enduring issues despite 
these changes, these conventional concerns have taken on 
more significant importance as a result of these trends.
Ethical debates in the research methods literature were 
once primarily about the ethical implications of some 
research practices (mostly the propriety of covert research) 
and of some data collection techniques (mostly participant 
observation), and debates about honesty, integrity, trust and 
confidentiality were framed within this limited focus (see, 
for example, the debate between Bulmer (1982) and Homan 
(1980, 1991)). The emergence of sensitivity as a methodo-
logical issue in the late 1980s (see Lee, 1994; Renzetti and 
Lee, 1993), and within that the identification of what was 
called dangerous research (Lee, 1995; Sluka, 1995), gave 
new meaning to ethical debates and broadened the range of 
issues and problems provoked by sensitive research. Brewer 
(1993), for example, noted how the sensitivity of the topic 
and its location not only raised new ethical challenges, it 
complicated the problems routinely experienced in all kinds 
of research (also see Brewer, 2000: 83ff, 2012b: 69–73).
The development of the idea of ‘risk society’ in the late 
1990s, which became paradigmatic within global social sci-
ence, articulated the notion that late modernity was exposed 
to new forms of structural risk and that citizens had been 
sensitised, indeed over-sensitised, to risks in their everyday 
life. The risk society was applied within the research meth-
ods field to make us aware of the risks respondents faced by 
some kinds of research, which was then broadened to cover 
risks also faced by researchers. To reinforce the importance 
of the latter emphasis, a code of conduct was developed in 
2001 by the Social Research Association for the safety of 
researchers, and Qualiti, a node of the Economic and Social 
Research Council’s (ESRC) National Centre for Research 
Methods based at Cardiff University, published a report in 
2007 on the emotional and physical harm suffered by quali-
tative researchers (see Bloor et al., 2007, 2010). Lee-Treweek 
and Linkogle’s (2000) edited collection on danger, risk and 
ethics was one of the most significant transition points when 
the research methods literature made the shift from locating 
discussions of ethics within the ideas of sensitivity and dan-
ger towards locating ethics within the idea of risk.
The imposition of science and medicine-based ethical reg-
ulatory frameworks in social science has made ethical clear-
ance an obligation, and within this, priority tends to be given 
to risk. Risk assessments are de rigueur for ethical clearance 
even for undergraduate dissertation projects nowadays. The 
primary focus within ethical debates is thus on identifying 
potential risks, minimising harm to respondents and research-
ers alike, respecting the autonomy of respondents, tough ethi-
cal clearance monitoring for researchers by ethical review 
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committees and guarantees of preserving the privacy of 
respondents and protecting confidentiality. Hammersley and 
Traianou (2014) refer to this as the dominant or standard form 
of research ethics discourse, with risk being the hub around 
which the conventional ethical issues of harm, confidentiality, 
informed consent, anonymity, trust and integrity are organ-
ised. This highlights the strong elements of continuity and 
change within contemporary ethics debates.
They refer, however, to the emergence of an alternative 
normative ethical discourse, which they call the new ethics, 
where the purpose of the research ought to be about realising 
social justice, the furtherance of human rights and an obliga-
tion to promote social care. This discourse represents a more 
profound change. It is represented best by world-leading spe-
cialists in qualitative methodology like Lincoln (1995) and 
Denzin (see Denzin and Giardina (2007b), as well as in 
research methods textbook by Mertens and Ginsberg (2009), 
Denzin and Giardina (2007a) and Denzin and Lincoln (2011), 
among others. (For a summary of this debate in a rival text-
book, see Hammersley and Traianou (2012).) The ‘new eth-
ics’, however, can also be located in broader changes within 
social science about public value, public sociology and the 
normative dimensions of social science that envision social 
science with a normative purpose to eliminate social suffer-
ing and promote the social good (on which see Brewer, 
2013). Yet, the new ethics is not a complete break with the 
past for it also has roots in long-standing methodological 
practices like participatory research, action research and 
feminist methodology, all of which involve empowering 
respondents and re-ordering the research relationship.
Hammersley and Traianou (2014) dismiss the new ethics 
because it is in contradiction with the central commitment of 
social researchers to produce ‘sound knowledge’ (p. 10). 
This is a harsh judgement for science and ethical responsibil-
ity are not mutually exclusive (see Brewer, 2014). However, 
the tension between the standard ethical discourse and the 
new ethics is thrown into particularly high relief by consider-
ing ethical issues involved in research on conflict, violence 
and peace. The principle of risk avoidance and ‘do no harm’ 
must be paramount when working in dangerous fields, but 
this sort of research also involves trying to do some good, of 
helping to transform the conflict, promote the peace and 
improve the lives of people in the midst of conflict or emerg-
ing from it.
Peace and conflict research is a field particularly useful 
for showing how some researchers have tried to balance their 
commitments to avoiding harm with doing good at the same 
time. While it helps disprove Hammersley and Traianou’s 
hasty assessment that the new ethics always produces 
unsound knowledge, this kind of research also poses very 
great ethical challenges that are not anticipated in the stand-
ard view of research ethics and involve some significant 
departures from it and thus from the textbook portrayal of 
ideal ethical practice. In trying to keep to conventional ethics 
codes of practice, peace and conflict researchers are often 
faced with moral and legal dilemmas that the codes are inad-
equate to meet. Some peace and conflict researchers, thus, 
have deemed standard ethical practices largely irrelevant and 
inapplicable in dangerous fields and have suggested adopt-
ing what they call a ‘localized ethic’ (see Kovats-Bernat, 
2002). This is indicative of how peace and conflict research-
ers have to be adaptable in their approach to ethical issues 
when in the field, leading to both marked variations between 
them in their ethical practice and to significant changes from 
the ethical practices of earlier generations.
The differing responses made by peace and conflict 
researchers to these challenges and dilemmas are worth high-
lighting for three reasons. First, differences between 
researchers in how they responded in situ to them have led to 
a particularly vituperative, emotive and aggressive debate 
among them about the ethical limits of conflict and peace 
research, especially with respect to the question of confiden-
tiality and whether it can be guaranteed within or outside the 
law, but also around the nature of informed consent, and the 
problem of over-identification with respondents in the field. 
Second, identifying these dilemmas and challenges has a 
capacity-building function by drawing them to the attention 
of new and unfamiliar researchers so that they can be better 
prepared when they enter dangerous fields. This is particu-
larly useful, for as Bloor et al. (2010) note, PhD students, 
junior researchers and early career researchers are often 
those most at risk of harm, being let down by principal inves-
tigators and supervisors who are themselves unaware of the 
risks, dilemmas and challenges of dangerous fields or who 
are not managing these challenges effectively enough. Third, 
because these challenges and dilemmas have not yet been 
codified but are discussed in isolated, hard-to-access and dis-
parate personal reflections on research practice by individual 
peace and conflict researchers, there is some value in draw-
ing the discussion together in this article. The best way to do 
this is to begin by reviewing the personal reflections of some 
of the leading peace and conflict researchers in order to pre-
pare for our later discussion on a new research covenant that 
systematises and codifies the ethical responsibilities of this 
kind of research.
Ethics in peace and conflict research
In a recent reflection on his research experiences as a PhD 
student doing fieldwork in Palestine, Browne (2013) encour-
aged peace and conflict researchers to be more reflexive, 
urging on them honesty and openness about its difficulties. 
He recommended the use of research diaries as ways for 
‘novice researchers’ to ‘record the personal’ (Browne, 2013: 
423). In fact, there has been a great deal of reflexivity, but it 
is disparate. In what follows, I review some of the reflexive 
accounts of fieldwork experiences by an assortment of 
peace and conflict researchers. Not all such researchers have 
been reflexive on their methodology and approach, so the 
review is highly selective, and while there are a few edited 
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collections that some time ago addressed social research in 
divided and violent societies (e.g. Nordstrom and Robben, 
1995; Smyth and Robinson, 2001), my review concentrates 
on ethical issues. It raises points about ethics which are wor-
thy of broader debate which are at the moment concealed 
within more disparate and dispersed personal reflections 
across a diverse set of journals and books. While this will be 
done on an individual basis, some of the generic, recurring 
issues in peace and conflict research that focus the broader 
debate stare out. These are the need to plan for adaptability, 
the problems around the nature of informed consent, respon-
sibilities towards confidentiality and what it means, the prob-
lem of managing risk, the need for data management and 
security, the problem of ‘guilty knowledge’ and how to man-
age it, complications around dissemination and publication, 
and the limits of ethical codes. In this latter respect, the dis-
cussion that follows demonstrates that ethical practice by 
peace and conflict researchers when in the field can contra-
dict professional ethics codes, and conformity to these codes 
can have the opposite effect to that intended by exposing 
respondents and researchers to greater threat and risk.
We begin with the personal reflections of the sociologist 
Gladys Ganiel (2013) based on her work on religion, conflict 
and peace in Zimbabwe. This is a useful starting place 
because they are contained within an edited collection 
designed to address ethics for graduate students, and Ganiel 
couches her reflections firmly within the normative commit-
ments of the new ethics. She wrote of the moral dimension to 
her research, feeling it must make a contribution to trans-
forming the violence (Ganiel, 2013: 168). She argued that 
this kind of research therefore challenged the idea of a 
notionally value-free tradition of positivist social science, 
since researchers needed to be fully embedded ethically in 
the worlds they are researching if they are to make a differ-
ence (which she recognised was also a strong feature of 
action research and feminist methodology).
Despite this tension with the value-free understanding of 
ethics, Ganiel (2013) recognised that peace and conflict 
research offers what she calls an ‘ethical opportunity’ (p. 167), 
the successful negotiation of which needs to be planned for 
at the outset. Researchers must try to anticipate known prob-
lems and plan for how they will manage the unexpected con-
tingencies that arise in dangerous fields so that they can 
produce reliable (or ‘sound’) knowledge. This involves plan-
ning for their own personal safety and for the personal safety 
of respondents, and consideration given to how they will 
communicate and disseminate their results without exposing 
their respondents – and perhaps themselves – to risk. She 
recounted her experiences in Zimbabwe with respect to con-
fidentiality and informed consent and argued that the risks 
required a departure from standard ethical practice in that she 
opted for oral consent not written in order for there to be no 
official written record of people’s participation in the 
research (Ganiel, 2013: 173). To further manage the risks of 
respondents’ exposure, tapes were erased immediately they 
were transcribed, and transcripts were erased from her laptop 
in the field once sent out of country electronically. This 
departure from standard ethical practice was done to protect 
her respondents from harm, something obliged under con-
ventional ethical codes but which was threatened by those 
very codes if she had stuck to them.
Ganiel felt sufficiently under the constraint of conven-
tional ethical practices, however, to reflect on what informed 
consent means if it was only orally given. She saw it as not 
deceiving people about the research or their participation 
(Ganiel, 2013: 174), which meant not making guarantees, 
promises and reassurances that knowingly could not be kept. 
She particularly warned of reckless self-serving publication 
and dissemination that places respondents at risk (Ganiel, 
2013: 176), and of the need to discuss publication risks with 
respondents when negotiating informed consent.
The anthropologist Elisabeth Wood’s (2006) work in El 
Salvador focused on local indigenous community involve-
ment in insurgency and was conducted while the civil war 
was ongoing. She described that the main ethical challenge 
was to adhere to the principle of ‘do no harm’ (Wood, 2006: 
373), particularly in protecting the anonymity and confiden-
tiality of respondents ‘to the extent possible’ (p. 373). She 
argued that where it was thought at the planning stage that 
the research could not be ethically conducted (such as where 
the principle of doing no harm could not be kept or anonym-
ity and confidentiality could not be guaranteed), the research 
should be curtailed or not attempted (Wood, 2006: 374). In 
her case, she reported how she hung back on publication of 
results in order not to expose respondents to risk (Wood, 
2006: 379).
In conflict zones, the risks to respondents come from dis-
closure of their involvement to security forces, and to 
researchers from being vetted by governments, paramilitar-
ies and by local leaders (Wood, 2006: 375). These vetting 
risks, of course, are faced also by translators (Wood, 2006: 
379) and gatekeepers. There is thus an ethical obligation on 
peace and conflict researchers to consider the impact of the 
research on a diverse range of people nominally connected to 
it, which includes, in addition to the above, the effect of sec-
ondary or vicarious traumatisation on transcribers and super-
visors who read victim narratives (emphasised by McCosker 
et al. (2001) in their work on ‘domestic’ violence). The risk 
of re-traumatisation of respondents as they renew the emo-
tional experiences they are accounting in their narratives is 
an ethical dilemma for all researchers studying emotionally 
sensitive material not just peace and conflict researchers, but 
in the latter field, secondary or vicarious traumatisation of 
the people only nominally involved in the research is a real 
risk (see Browne and Moffett, 2014: 227).
Wood’s reflections confirm the special ethical challenge 
posed by informed consent in peace and conflict research. 
She argued that respondents should be made fully aware of 
all potential known risks and benefits of their participation, 
so that they make an informed decision (Wood, 2006: 379). 
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They should also be informed of the risk of the unanticipated 
and the unexpected. Wood again departed from the ideal 
textbook portrayal of ethical practice in the standard view of 
ethics by using oral not written consent (Wood, 2006: 380), 
in part to get over illiteracy in her respondents but primarily 
to ensure there was no written record linking respondents to 
the research that could expose them to risk. Ironically, the 
‘do no harm’ principle so central to conventional ethical 
practice obligated breaching the codes that enforce it because 
to do otherwise would bring the very harm the codes were 
designed to avoid.
In the informed consent stage, Wood recounts how she 
managed the problem of ‘guilty knowledge’ (a term widely 
in use to refer to disclosure in interview of respondents’ 
knowledge of or participation in illegal activity; see 
Fetterman, 1983). It was dealt with by explaining beforehand 
what respondents could and could not talk about, whether 
what they said was or was not for publication, and by empha-
sising that they had the option to decline to answer questions. 
In this way, the process of informed consent was used to 
allow respondents to exercise their own control over the con-
tent of the interview (Wood, 2006: 381). She did not address 
the question of the law and what she would have done if data 
had been requested by state forces, so the promises she made 
about confidentiality were not put to the test. This is a point 
we come back to below.
Wood (2006) emphasises the importance of ensuring the 
security of the data (p. 381) when doing peace and conflict 
research. Names were not recorded, she did not tape inter-
views with some respondents, precautions were taken at 
checkpoints and when crossing borders to conceal data files 
and transcripts, data were sent back to the United States elec-
tronically very quickly (Wood, 2006: 381), and she linked 
herself to religious figures, using their status and legitimacy 
in a religious culture to provide some protection and as a 
cover for her data (p. 382). To further avoid harm, some 
material was excluded from immediate publication, some of 
the most sensitive was delayed and not published until a dec-
ade later, and some not at all, despite the respondents’ per-
mission to use it (Wood, 2006: 382).
Interestingly, Wood also conducted her research under 
what we have called here the normative commitment of the 
new ethics, writing of her sense of ethical responsibility to 
return something to the community. She met this ethical 
responsibility through establishing anonymised archives and 
holding community workshops (Wood, 2006: 383) – there 
are many other ways of communicating findings back to 
respondents discussed in Ganiel (2013: 177) – enabling 
Wood to feel that the research itself became a contribution as 
a form of intervention mitigating in a small way the harm 
experienced by respondents as a result of the conflict. Like 
humanitarian aid, she writes, research can itself be a benefit 
in dangerous fields. The commitment within the new ethics 
to both ethical responsibility and science was thus satisfied 
in Wood’s case by developing reciprocal relationships with 
respondents which returned something back to them. 
Nurturing reciprocity in relationships with respondents is 
itself a way of dealing with the ethical challenges posed by 
peace and conflict research.
Christopher Kovats-Bernat (2002) is an anthropologist 
with extensive experience of working in Haiti, and he defines 
‘dangerous fields’ as fieldwork sites where data are affected 
by fear, the threat of force and violence (p. 208). As unstable 
field sites, they are places where customary approaches to 
ethics are insufficient and sometimes inapplicable, and do 
not prepare researchers for the moral dilemmas they face 
(Kovats-Bernat, 2002: 213–214). In what by now should be 
a familiar theme, he argues dangerous fields therefore 
involve a departure from the textbook portrayal of the ideal 
methodological practice, forcing researchers to innovate. If 
standard ethical codes cannot meet the challenges faced, the 
response should not be to operate unethically, regardless of 
any responsibility and obligation towards respondents, but to 
use the very local knowledge of people in the field to deter-
mine what is ethically permissible and possible. Kovats-
Bernat (2002) refers to this as a ‘localized ethic’ (p. 214), 
which he describes as taking stock of the good advice and 
recommendations of the local population in deciding what is 
permissible and doable in the light of the dangers that they 
are better informed about than the researcher.
This localised ethic may limit practices that ethical codes 
permit, or require practices that ethical codes do not favour 
– he also cites the use of oral rather than written consent 
(Kovats-Bernat, 2002: 215). This localised ethic must also 
make researchers sensitive to their inability to guarantee 
safety and their powerlessness to anticipate all the threats 
faced by respondents (Kovats-Bernat, 2002: 215). He argues 
that two consequences follow from this. First, peace and con-
flict researchers need to be cautious in what is promised and 
what they allege can be guaranteed; and second, they need to 
think carefully about the balance between what the informa-
tion is worth against the dangers to respondents and research-
ers involved in collecting and reporting it (Kovats-Bernat, 
2002: 211). In the light of this, he argues that a localised ethic 
ensures respondents’ own local knowledge dictates ethical 
practice and defines the ethical limits and parameters of the 
research.
The problem with this advice, however, is that in peace 
and conflict research, there will be multiple competing 
voices, resulting in local knowledge being fractured and con-
tradictory, spread across diverse constituencies, like victims, 
perpetrators, non-state military combatants, state combat-
ants, the grassroots, civil society, politicians and the like, the 
strong differences between whom defined the very nature of 
the conflict and structured the violence. Local ethical frame-
works will be manifold and choices may need to be made 
about whose voices matter in the research. Jonathan 
Goodhand (2000) makes this point when reflecting on his 
experiences of researching in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and 
Liberia. He identifies three main challenges – practical, 
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methodological and ethical – and focuses on the latter. He 
argues that conflict heightens and amplifies the ethical chal-
lenges faced by researchers, requiring them at the planning 
stage to develop sufficient understanding of the ethical issues 
raised by their research (Goodhand, 2000: 15). Consistent 
with the new ethics, researchers need to develop an ethical 
framework for decision-making that avoids harm and opens 
up the possibility of doing some good (Goodhand, 2000: 12). 
He specifically recommends thinking about whose voices 
are to be heard and whose knowledge is to count in the 
research (Goodhand, 2000: 12).
Researchers can avoid doing harm, he writes, by not 
infringing the security, well-being and safety of respondents, 
which means that ethically informed decision-making 
involves peace and conflict researchers thinking about the 
impact of the research on respondents in war zones 
(Goodhand, 2000: 13). This requires them to think about how 
they conduct the research, who they talk to and what to talk 
about, all in order not to expose individuals and communities 
to risk (Goodhand, 2000: 13). More than other researchers, 
peace and conflict researchers must be sensitive to the needs 
and fears of conflict-affected communities. This involves giv-
ing consideration to what topics respondents will feel sensi-
tive about, what will endanger them and what will be the 
lasting effect of the research long after the researcher has left 
the field. Their local knowledge will indicate this, but differ-
ences between constituencies will almost certainly result in 
significant variations in what they find sensitive, dangerous 
and risky. Two moral dilemmas therefore ensue that we can 
pose as questions. Whom among the voiceless does the peace 
the conflict researcher give voice to? How does the peace and 
conflict researcher bear witness to abuse without endangering 
the abused (or themselves)? Goodhand therefore reinforces 
Kovats-Bernat’s (2002) point that ethical decision-making in 
the field of peace and conflict research involves asking 
whether the research warrants the risks (p. 13). Goodhand 
(2000) argues further that in not preparing peace and conflict 
researchers to resolve these issues (or supervisors and princi-
pal investigators perhaps persisting with the research regard-
less that the risks do not make it worth doing), it is unethical 
to involve researchers who are inexperienced and unfamiliar 
with working in areas of conflict (p. 13).
One of the features of ethical practice that Goodhand 
(2000) alerts us to most strongly is the importance of not 
encouraging unrealistic expectations in respondents – unre-
alistic expectations about the benefits and impact of the 
research (p. 14), about the limits of confidentiality and ano-
nymity, and the security of the data. Goodhand does not 
mention the problem of legal limits on confidentiality. For 
him, the key principle is to do no harm. The mechanisms he 
identifies to achieve this should by now be repetitious: by 
showing sensitivity to ethical issues, predicting likely ethi-
cal challenges, reflexivity on the likely effects of the 
research on people and communities, obtaining informed 
consent, honesty in outlining the objectives of the research 
and building reciprocity in relationships with respondents 
through dialogue with the community and building links 
with local partners.
In this context, the advice of Brendan Browne and Luke 
Moffett (2014; also see Browne, 2013), transitional justice 
researchers who have worked in Uganda and Palestine, is 
salutary.
Despite all the planning, they urge peace and conflict 
researchers to prepare for unforeseen contingencies by being 
flexible and adaptable in the field. They describe how they 
managed the risks as young PhD researchers by working with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) established in the 
field (also see Wood, 2006: 383–384), and had to be willing 
to accept the constraints that come with this, as well as becom-
ing reconciled to an unusually high reliance on gatekeepers 
(Browne and Moffett, 2014: 228), which brought with it the 
attendant problem of finding the right gatekeepers (Browne 
and Moffett, 2014: 228). They describe the great lengths they 
both went to in protecting the security of their data and their 
sense of ethical responsibility towards the researched com-
munities. In this last respect, they emphasised the importance 
of reciprocity as an ethical obligation on researchers, which 
they refer to as knowledge exchange back to respondents 
(Browne and Moffett, 2014: 229). They do not consider, how-
ever, a special form of harm in peace and conflict research 
around the problem of guilty knowledge.
The criminologist Dermot Feenan (2002) addressed this 
issue directly. While the term ‘guilty knowledge’ might be 
thought inappropriate because of its negative connotations, it 
is widely in use in the research methods literature and it does 
not involve a moral judgement of the respondents who dis-
close it. Some forms of research are at very high risk of 
revealing guilty knowledge and thus of research data being 
sought by police, national security forces and the courts. The 
controversial nature of its data makes peace and conflict 
research notable among these. There have been several cases 
of enforced disclosure in the United States (see Feenan, 
2002: 762), but at the time at which Feenan wrote, it was 
journalists who had been affected in the United Kingdom. 
Lowman and Palys (2014) consider a few subsequent cases 
in the United Kingdom where social researchers were subject 
to pressure to disclose the guilty knowledge that had confi-
dentially come their way. Some social researchers believe 
they have responsibility as law-abiding citizens to report 
knowledge of illegal behaviour (see, for example, Yablonsky, 
1968), others say they would disclose only if there was an 
intention to harm another person, while others keep to the 
practice of never revealing guilty knowledge confidentially 
obtained (see, for example, Lowman and Palys, 2014; Polsky, 
1967). Some well-known qualitative researchers have 
refused to comply with court requests – such as Van Maanen 
(1983) – although the law suit against him was withdrawn so 
the issue of disclosure under duress became irrelevant.
Most codes of ethical conduct do not address the problem 
of court-ordered disclosures (Feenan, 2002: 766). The British 
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Psychological Association, however, recommends that 
researchers warn respondents at the informed consent stage 
of the risk that the information may be subject to subpoena, 
so that respondents can take this into account when deciding 
to participate (see Feenan, 2002: 767). The ESRC in 2000 
warned that while there is a duty to confidentiality, there are 
exceptions when disclosure is required in relation to crimi-
nal investigations or under court order (Feenan, 2002: 767). 
As the law stands at the moment, research data are not enti-
tled to special protection from court disclosure (Feenan, 
2002: 776). We might argue that it should, but the hard fact 
remains it is not.
Feenan (2002: 772–773) explains the legal position that 
even where a researcher states that information will be kept 
confidential, any information that is confided as a result is 
still subject to the law on confidentiality. Confidentiality leg-
islation works two ways. Researchers have an obligation to 
keep confidential any information disclosed by a respondent 
unless given the express consent by them to publicise it 
(hence the importance of informed consent and the require-
ment to discuss potential publication, and within that, 
whether anonymity is required, and if so, how). Researchers, 
however, are also legally obliged to disclose information 
regardless of promises of confidentiality when expressly 
ordered to do so by the courts (hence the problem of guilty 
knowledge). This means that researchers need to be cautious 
in their promises and guarantees of confidentiality when 
courts can force disclosure. This raises the moral dilemma – 
which is also a profound legal problem – of whether or not to 
disregard the law.
Of course, the best way to deal with this dilemma is to 
avoid having to confront it in the first place. It is part of a 
researcher’s ethical practice to plan for how they will man-
age the likelihood of coming across guilty knowledge; it is 
ethically irresponsible to deny it will be an issue and thus to 
fail to discuss it. Feenan suggests three ways of managing the 
dilemma. First, being cautious and open about the legal lim-
its of confidentiality when in discussions with respondents at 
the informed consent stage, for researchers have an ethical 
responsibility to disclose the possibility that data could be 
subpoenaed (Feenan, 2002: 775). Second, researchers should 
plan ahead for how to deal with guilty knowledge by trying 
to avoid its disclosure in the first place. This requires careful 
negotiations with the respondent about the limits of the top-
ics to be addressed. The experiences of Wood (2006: 381) in 
managing guilty knowledge have already been referred to as 
an example. Third, the calculation should be made whether 
the information is worth the risks of its exposure. Research 
where details of offences are sought simply should not be 
undertaken (Feenan, 2002: 775–776), or its topic should be 
redesigned so that this is not its primary aim. This confirms 
the advice of Goodhand (2000: 13) above that some forms of 
research are not worth the risk of collecting or reporting it.
But the problem remains of what to do if there is potential 
for the data to be subpoenaed by the court. Peace and conflict 
researchers have handled this risk in different ways, and the 
varying choices they made have generated a heated debate. 
Two cases are worth exploring in detail for the lessons they 
bear. These lessons are different in each case. The so-called 
Alice Goffman Affair usefully illustrates how the time-old 
problems around the boundary between participation and 
observation within ethnography are heightened for ethno-
graphic researchers studying violence, conflict and peace, 
while the so-called Boston College Affair highlights how tra-
ditional concerns around confidentiality and anonymity can 
become dangerously problematic when they involve peace 
and conflict research.
The Alice Goffman Affair revolves around her PhD 
research on police-community conflict in a Black neighbour-
hood in Philadelphia which was leading to an over-represen-
tation of young Black males ending up in prison (later 
published as Goffman (2014); for a similar case, see 
Venkatesh (2008), which reflects on his ethnographic 
research on drug gangs in Chicago). According to Parry 
(2015), the Goffman case shows the ethical boundaries of 
ethnography. The problem surrounds her disclosure in an 
appendix that she acted voluntarily as driver for an individ-
ual on the lookout for the killer of one of her key respondents 
and declaring that on this night, when willingly driving the 
car, she had wanted the killer to die. This is unlawful and 
represents conspiracy to commit a crime. Lubet (2015) 
argues that Goffman participated in a serious felony by con-
spiracy to commit murder.
The ethical challenge for her was whether she had been 
too honest or not honest enough. In one sense, she was too 
honest in admitting to feeling this emotion and to acting it 
out in this manner. Lubet (2015) warns ethnographers about 
expressing ‘bone-deep emotions’, since acting on them is an 
entirely different matter, from which he infers that impulse 
control is an indispensable tool for the ethical ethnographer. 
By not demonstrating this control, Lubet claims Goffman 
endangered other people’s lives (both the assailant and the 
intended victim), never mind her own, which was an ethical 
breach of the worst kind, since the first principle is always 
‘do no harm’. He thus cautions young and old researchers 
alike, ‘if you’re asked to murder someone, just say no’.
In another sense, however, she had not been honest 
enough, for when debate about her revelation became wide-
spread and nasty, she subsequently claimed she had embel-
lished the story and knew there was no risk of a felony being 
committed that night. The lesson here is that an ethically 
responsible researcher needs to resist the temptation to sen-
sationalism, aggrandisement and self-serving forms of pub-
lication. A fast buck and easy royalties are not worth the lack 
of ethical integrity cheap publicity displays. Goffman 
reported that she subsequently destroyed the data by shred-
ding her notes and disposing of the computer hard drive 
under fear of being subpoenaed (Lubet, 2015: 6), something 
she could not have done if there had already been a sub-
poena without her committing the crime of contempt of 
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court. This is precisely the problem faced by the researchers 
in the Boston College Affair.
The Boston College Affair involves the development of 
an oral history archive lodged at the College on Northern 
Ireland’s conflict. Many leading figures were interviewed, 
including some of the main ex-combatants in the paramili-
tary organisations. The archive collapsed when the Police 
Force of Northern Ireland (PSNI) made successful requests 
in the US courts for access to the data. The researchers have 
called for the destruction of the data, but it is now under court 
jurisdiction. They have also urged that social research data 
be exempted – in their case retrospectively – from enforced 
court disclosure. The PSNI used some of the information to 
make arrests (although there have been no prosecutions yet). 
In Palys and Lowman’s (2012) detailed chronology of the 
affair, they state that the Boston researchers gave promises of 
confidentiality without limit or reservation and without 
drawing to respondents’ attention that there might be a threat 
of subpoena (Palys and Lowman, 2012: 272). One of things 
lost sight of in the affair is that researchers gave promises 
that information would not be disclosed in respondents’ life 
times but went ahead and published a highly contentious 
book that made controversial allegations about current politi-
cal figures that served to draw attention to the data (Maloney, 
2010). The researchers have blamed Boston College for not 
upholding their promises and guarantees. They have not to 
my knowledge reflected on whether it was ethically irrespon-
sible to make those guarantees knowing that they could not 
be kept within the law and then to themselves abrogate the 
promises by publishing within the life time of some of the 
people referred to in the book.
While the researchers have attended only to the ethical 
responsibilities of Boston College, in a follow-up article, 
Lowman and Palys (2014) strongly defended the ethical pro-
priety of the researchers and argued that it was British sociol-
ogy that had betrayed the principle of research confidentiality, 
and that the BSA and myself as its President, among others, 
were colluding in an attack on academic freedom. What 
brought on this accusation was that I had written a letter 
(Brewer, 2012a) to the Times Higher in a personal capacity 
from my work address, criticising the view that the Boston 
College researchers were innocent victims caught up in the 
affair by pointing out some of the ways that they had brought 
it upon themselves. To my knowledge, the BSA has still not 
issued any formal statement on the Boston College Affair, 
but the personal ethical stance I took based on my long expe-
rience as a peace and conflict researcher was expanded into a 
case against the BSA.
The ethical stance I took then – and still take – is that 
guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity are vital under 
the moral and legal principle of doing no harm but that, like 
all aspects of research practice, they are subject to the law. 
Lowman and Palys (2014) referred to this stance as the ‘law 
of the land’ approach, which they contrasted pejoratively 
with their own stance that emphasised the importance of 
protecting respondents’ anonymity and confidentiality 
regardless of the law and at all costs, freeing ethics and social 
research generally from the constraints of the law. The ‘law 
of the land’ approach was said to subjugate ethics to law. 
Naturally, I see ethical responsibility working quite differ-
ently. Ethical practice requires respect for the law. I cannot 
see how it is compatible with ethics, even the ‘new ethics’, 
for researchers to knowingly act criminally or outside the 
law. The Alice Goffman Affair shows us that.
The BSA and I were accused nonetheless of attacking the 
first principle of ethical practice because allegedly we offered 
no protection from harm for respondents. In situ, on-the-hoof 
decisions lead naturally to variations in ethical practice; this is 
to be expected. However, reasonable and legitimate questions 
can also be asked of Lowman and Palys’ alternative ethical 
position. How ethical is it to offer promises of confidentiality 
and anonymity that knowingly cannot be kept? Harm is 
alleged to be risked to respondents when researchers act 
within the law, but what of the harm to respondents when 
researchers do not discuss the risk of subpoena and then are 
not able to keep their promises under court rulings? Lowman 
and Palys (2012) refer to the law of the land approach as ‘truly 
disturbing’ (p. 114), but is it not equally disturbing to promote 
the illusion that confidentiality and anonymity can be pro-
tected at all costs? In counter it could be argued that harm 
is caused when researchers embellish and make promises 
that knowingly cannot be kept, and that researchers display 
ethical irresponsibility when the risks of subpoena are not 
discussed at the informed consent stage. Lowman and Palys 
assume that confidentiality guarantees should have no limit, 
but what about harm to researchers when they are subpoenaed 
or even jailed under contempt of court? The no harm principle 
that we equally endorse is Janus-faced, for harm is surely 
done by the suggestion that there are no limits to the guaran-
tee and that researchers are above the law. The law of the 
land approach is accused of being unethical, but is it ethical to 
suggest researchers are above the law?
The implications of the Boston College Affair are three-
fold. Peace and conflict researchers need to be cautious and 
judicious in what they promise; they need to be open and 
honest in how they outline the risks faced by respondents; 
and they need to be careful in how they publish results and 
the way they write in order to protect against harm. In such 
an assessment, I have the support of researchers who are 
experienced in undertaking peace and conflict research in 
dangerous fields and whose work has been reviewed above.
What I have tried to argue in this review of researchers’ 
fieldwork experiences is that peace and conflict research 
poses severe dilemmas and challenges that researchers have 
had to respond to on the hoof, forcing researchers to make 
honest calls that others may well disagree with or which dif-
fer, sometimes fundamentally, from the textbook portrayal of 
ideal ethical practice and from tough regulatory frameworks 
that are often ill designed for the peculiar challenges of dan-
gerous fields. The choices they made in good faith deserve 
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more empathy, for peace and conflict researchers have had to 
respond without much formal training or any codification of 
the ethical practices essential for this kind of research.
It is with this idea of codification in mind that we turn in 
the next section to the notion of a research covenant to better 
clarify and shape the ethical obligations and responsibilities 
of peace and conflict researchers. Such a covenant should 
accurately reflect the diverse range of ethical challenges and 
dilemmas of peace and conflict research and point towards 
improved ethical practices that can guide research in danger-
ous fields.
A research covenant for ethical 
practice in peace and conflict research
These thoughts on a research covenant are not fully devel-
oped or finalised and are best understood as a prolegomenon 
or notes towards a formulation. Let me first clear away poten-
tial misunderstandings. Some interpretations of the word cov-
enant see it as a legal contract. A legally binding written 
agreement between researchers and respondents is not the 
way we should go in improving ethical practice in peace and 
conflict research. I have in mind more the religious connota-
tions of the term covenant that extend back to Abraham in the 
Old Testament that portray it as a statement of understanding, 
expressing obligations and responsibilities that form a moral 
rather than a legal commitment. Furthermore, my role in 
articulating this research covenant is, continuing the religious 
metaphor, that of a diviner not an originator, in that much of 
the contents of the research covenant are drawn from the 
experiences that have structured the reflexivity of knowl-
edgeable and practiced peace and conflict researchers dis-
cussed above. In other words, the research covenant is 
embedded in the experiences of several expert peace and con-
flict researchers. These are people who have shown serious 
ambition to develop ‘sound knowledge’ and good ethical 
practice and who have wrestled thoughtfully with the ethical 
challenges their research has provoked while also feeling 
themselves under an ethical responsibility to make a differ-
ence to the individuals and communities they study.
In this spirit of divination, therefore, I suggest that a 
research covenant for ethical practice in peace and conflict 
research should comprise the following moral obligations 
and commitments:
•• The use only of adequately trained and experienced 
researchers familiar with the difficulties of working in 
conflict zones and in societies emerging out of 
conflict.
•• The need to plan ahead to anticipate ethical issues and 
to plan for adaptability and flexibility in the field to 
deal with the unexpected.
•• The need for full, open and comprehensive disclosure 
in negotiations of informed consent, including any 
potential risks of subpoena and whether informed 
consent has to be oral rather than written for some or 
all respondents.
•• Honesty and openness in the status of the guarantees 
of confidentiality and anonymity.
•• A detailed risk assessment to anticipate known risks, 
and a strategy for the management of risk, whether to 
respondents, researchers, gatekeepers, translators and 
all those directly or nominally affected by the research, 
including a calculation of whether the information is 
worth the anticipated risks in collecting and reporting it.
•• A detailed plan for the management of data and its 
safety and security.
•• Managing the problem of ‘guilty knowledge’ and how 
best to frame the research to reduce or eliminate the 
chances of uncovering it.
•• Addressing the anticipated complications around dis-
semination and publication, including consideration 
of strategies like delaying publication, not publishing 
some data and developing a writing style that is not 
sensationalist or which embellishes.
•• The need for reciprocity in the relationship with the 
researched community so that something is returned 
as a form of intervention, acknowledgement and rec-
ognition, that goes some way to making a difference 
to their lives.
The development of a research covenant for ethical prac-
tice with these moral commitments is a necessity for peace 
and conflict researchers to restore some of the damage done 
in notorious cases of malpractice. This research covenant can 
help restore trust between peace and conflict researchers and 
respondents in dangerous fields in two ways. First, the 
research covenant makes explicit that the research will not 
bring harm to respondents by irresponsible, careless, illegal 
and professionally inept and unethical behaviour on the part 
of researchers. Second, it makes explicit that the research 
involves no dishonesty, deception or dissimulation by the 
researcher, so that what the respondent gets is what the 
researcher says at the outset in negotiating informed consent.
Conclusion
Peace and conflict research will always present higher risks 
and greater ethical challenges than research done in non-dan-
gerous fields. Its challenges are several and severe, as this arti-
cle has highlighted. There are practical and methodological 
problems involved in this kind of research, and it presents 
deep emotional strains, ranging from the loneliness and stress 
involved in working in dangerous and isolated locations to the 
risk of secondary traumatisation from hearing people’s narra-
tives. This article has focused solely on its ethical challenges.
Despite the severity of these ethical challenges, the adop-
tion of a research covenant can help eliminate, manage and 
ameliorate the known risks and try to anticipate the unknown 
ones. Careful planning before entry into dangerous fields is 
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essential. During fieldwork, it is essential that ethical prac-
tice is maintained, whether through conventional ethical 
codes, localised ethical knowledge or a combination of both, 
but ethical practice within the limits of the law and within the 
constraints imposed by the risks of the setting. Post-
fieldwork, ethical practice requires consideration given 
towards publication, dissemination and writing style, as well 
to discharging the ethical responsibility to return something 
back to respondents.
Above all, ethical debates need to be conducted ethically. 
This means without emotion or sensationalism and by 
extending empathy and understanding to the on-the-hoof 
decisions peace and conflict researchers have had to make 
when in situ. These on-the-hoof decisions can involve depar-
ture from the textbook portrayal of ideal ethical practice and 
from conventional ethical codes. These deviations and depar-
tures need to be understood and accepted by ethics clearance 
committees, supervisors and principal investigators, who 
often have unrealistic expectations of what ethical practice 
means in dangerous fields.
Empathy and understanding are also necessary among 
researchers themselves who are debating ethical practices, 
for an ethical debate on ethics practices requires sensitivity 
being shown towards the different choices circumstances 
have led some researchers to make. One way of reducing 
emotional intensity in ethical debates is to codify ethical 
practice around some generic moral commitments that help 
better in clarifying and shape the ethical obligations and 
responsibilities of peace and conflict researchers. The 
research covenant outlined here is proffered as a prolegom-
enon towards this.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect 
to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-
ship and/or publication of this article.
References
Bloor M, Fincham B and Sampson H (2007) Commissioned Inquiry 
into the Risks to Well-Being of Researchers in Qualitative 
Research. Cardiff: School of Social Sciences.
Bloor M, Fincham B and Sampson H (2010) Unprepared 
for the worst: Risks of harm for qualitative researchers. 
Methodological Innovations Online 5(1): 45–55.
Brewer JD (1993) Sensitivity as a problem in field research. In: 
Renzetti C and Lee R (eds) Sensitive Research Topics. London: 
SAGE, pp. 125–145.
Brewer JD (2000) Ethnography. Buckingham: Open University 
Press.
Brewer JD (2012a) Inescapable burden of ‘Guilty Knowledge’. 
Times Higher Education, 26 January. Available at: https://
www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/letters/inescapable-
burden-of-guilty-knowledge/418834.article
Brewer JD (2012b) Researching sensitive topics. In: Becker S, 
Bryman A and Ferguson H (eds) Understanding Research 
for Social Policy and Social Work. Bristol: Policy Press, 
pp. 69–73.
Brewer JD (2013) The Public Value of the Social Sciences. London: 
Bloomsbury.
Brewer JD (2014) Society as a vocation: Renewing social sci-
ence for social renewal. Irish Journal of Sociology 22(2): 
127–137.
Browne B (2013) Recording the personal. International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 12: 420–435.
Browne B and Moffett L (2014) Finding your feet in the field. 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 6(2): 223–237.
Bulmer M (1982) Social Research Ethics. London: Macmillan.
Denzin N and Giardina M (2007a) Ethical Futures in Qualitative 
Research. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
Denzin N and Giardina M (2007b) Introduction: Ethical futures 
in qualitative research. In: Denzin N and Giardina M (eds) 
Ethical Futures in Qualitative Research. Walnut Creek CA: 
Left Coast Press, pp. 9–44.
Denzin N and Lincoln YS (2011) SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (4th edn). London: SAGE.
Feenan D (2002) Legal issues in acquiring information about illegal 
behaviour through criminological research. British Journal of 
Criminology 42: 762–781.
Fetterman D (1983) Guilty knowledge, dirty hands and other ethical 
dilemmas. Human Organization 42(3): 214–224.
Ganiel G (2013) Research ethics in divided and violent societies. 
In: Russell C, Hogan L and Junker-Kenny M (eds) Ethics for 
Graduate Students. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 167–181.
Goffman A (2014) On the Run. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press.
Goodhand J (2000) Research in conflict zones. Forced Migration 
8: 12–15.
Hammersley M and Traianou A (2012) Ethics in Qualitative 
Research. London: SAGE.
Hammersley M and Traianou A (2014) An alternative ethic? 
Justice and care as guiding principles for qualitative research. 
Sociological Research Online 19(3). Available at: http://www.
socresonline.org.uk/19/3/24
Homan R (1980) The ethics of covert research. British Journal of 
Sociology 31: 46–59.
Homan R (1991) The Ethics of Social Research. London: Longman.
Kovats-Bernat C (2002) Negotiating dangerous fields. American 
Anthropologist 104(1): 208–222.
Lee R (1994) Doing Sensitive Research. London: SAGE.
Lee R (1995) Dangerous Fieldwork. London: SAGE.
Lee-Treweek G and Linkogle S (2000) Danger in the Field. 
London: Routledge.
Lincoln YS (1995) Emerging criteria for quality in qualitative and 
interpretive inquiry. Qualitative Inquiry 1(3): 275–289.
Lowman J and Palys T (2014) The betrayal of research confiden-
tiality in British Sociology. Research Ethics 10(2): 97–118.
Lubet S (2015) Ethics on the run. The New Rambler: An Online 
Review of Books. Available at: http://newramblerreview.com/
book-reviews/law/ethics-on-the-run
McCosker H, Barnard A and Gerber R (2001) Undertaking sen-
sitive research. Forum: Qualitative Social Research 2(1). 
Available at: http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/
fqs/article/view/983/214
Brewer 11
Maloney E (2010) Voices from the Grave. London: Faber and Faber.
Mertens D and Ginsberg P (2009) Handbook of Research Ethics. 
London: SAGE.
Nordstrom C and Robben A (1995) Fieldwork under Fire. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press.
Palys T and Lowman J (2012) Defending research confidentiality 
‘To the extent the law allows’. Journal of Academic Ethics 
10(4): 271–297.
Parry M (2015) Conflict over sociologist’s narrative puts spot-
light on ethnography. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 22 
June. Available at: http://chronicle.com/article/Conflict-Over-
Sociologists/230883/
Polsky N (1967) Hustlers, Beats and Others. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
Renzetti C and Lee R (1993) Sensitive Research Topics. London: 
SAGE.
Sluka J (1995) Reflections on managing danger in fieldwork. 
In: Nordstrom C and Robben A (eds) Fieldwork under Fire 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 276–294.
Smyth M and Robinson G (2001) Researching Violently Divided 
Societies. London: Pluto Press.
Van Maanen J (1983) On the ethics of fieldwork. In: Smith R (ed.) 
A Handbook of Social Science Methods Vol. 1. Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger, pp. 227–251.
Venkatesh S (2008) Gang Leader for a Day. New York: Penguin Press.
Wood E (2006) The ethical challenges of field research in conflict 
zones. Qualitative Sociology 29: 373–386.
Yablonsky L (1968) On crime, violence, LSD and legal immunity 
for social scientists. American Sociologist 3: 148–149.
Author biography
John D Brewer was awarded an honorary doctorate from Brunel 
University in 2012 for services to social science and the sociology of 
peace processes. He is a Member of the Royal Irish Academy (2004), 
a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (2008), a Fellow in the 
Academy of Social Sciences (2003) and a Fellow of the Royal 
Society of Arts (1998). He has held visiting appointments at Yale 
University (1989), St John’s College Oxford (1991), Corpus Christi 
College Cambridge (2002) and the Australia National University 
(2003). In 2007–2008, he was a Leverhulme Trust Research Fellow. 
He has been President of the British Sociological Association 
(2009–2012) and is now Honorary Life Vice President. He has been 
a member of the Governing Council of the Irish Research Council 
and of the Council of the Academy of Social Science. In 2010, he 
was appointed to the United Nations Roster of Global Experts for his 
expertise in peace processes. He is the author or co-author of 15 
books and editor or co-editor of a further three. He is Principal 
Investigator on a £1.26m cross-national, 6-year project on compro-
mise among victims of conflict, funded by The Leverhulme Trust, 
and is Book Series Editor for Palgrave Studies in Compromise after 
Conflict. He runs an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
Advanced Training Short Course on the legal, ethical and moral 
issues in researching conflict, violence and peace.
